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ABSTRACT 
This study examines the determinants of tax administration efficiency. Tax is a medium 
which countries across the globe depend upon so as to carry out the mandate of their citizens. 
Unfortunately, the Nigerian tax system is faced with challenges, such as loss of revenue 
through high level of tax defaulters from both the legislative arm of the government and 
public institutions, corruption and financial irregularities and limited government 
administrative capability. Tax, as a percentage of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP), 
contributes only seven percent to the Nigerian economy which is below the minimum 
benchmark of 15% of low income African countries. Therefore, this study examines the 
influence of autonomy of the State Board of Internal Revenue (SBIR), use of information and 
communications technology, public enlightenment, strong auditing practice, motivation and 
incentives and perceived corruption on tax administration efficiency in Nigeria. A mixed 
research design was used, and data was collected through survey and interview. A total of 124 
questionnaires were collected out of 144 questionnaires that were administered. The data was 
analysed to answer the research questions. The study revealed that there is a significant 
relationship between tax administration efficiency and: autonomy of board of internal 
revenue, information and communications technology and public enlightenment. The study 
further revealed that there is no significant relationship between tax administration efficiency 
and strong audit practice and motivation and incentives and perceived corruption. The 
qualitative findings of this study indicate that reformation and restructuring of the tax system 
and granting of autonomy can help to boost revenue generation and administration efficiency. 
The qualitative findings further reveal that autonomy, public enlightenment and use of 
information and communications technology are some of the determinants of tax 
administration efficiency. Given the findings from the study, it is recommended that 
government should put an effective measure in place to collect taxes from tax defaulters 
across the different groups of the economy. 
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ABSTRAK 
Kajian ini mengkaji faktor-faktor penentu kecekapan pentadbiran cukai. Cukai adalah 
medium kebergantungan bagi negara-negara di seluruh dunia untuk menjalankan mandat 
kepada rakyat masing-masing. Malangnya, sistem cukai Nigeria berhadapan dengan cabaran, 
seperti kehilangan hasil melalui tahap pembayaran cukai daripada kedua-dua institusi 
perundangan kerajaan dan institusi awam, rasuah dan penyelewengan kewangan dan 
keupayaan kerajaan pentadbiran yang terhad. Cukai, sebagai peratusan daripada Keluaran 
Dalam Negara Kasar (KDNK), menyumbang hanya tujuh peratus kepada ekonomi Nigeria 
iaitu di bawah tahap minima sebanyak 15% daripada pendapatan negara-negara Afrika. Oleh 
itu, kajian ini meneliti pengaruh autonomi Lembaga Negeri Hasil Dalam Negeri (SBIR), 
penggunaan teknologi maklumat dan komunikasi, kesedaran awam, amalan pengauditan, 
motivasi dan insentif dan rasuah ke atas kecekapan pentadbiran cukai di Nigeria. Satu reka 
bentuk penyelidikan campuran telah digunakan, dan data dikumpulkan melalui kaji selidik 
dan temubual. Sebanyak 124 soal selidik telah dikumpul daripada 144 soal selidik yang 
diedar. Data telah dianalisis untuk menjawab persoalan kajian. Keputusan kajian 
menunjukkan terdapat hubungan yang signifikan antara kecekapan pentadbiran cukai dan 
autonomi lembaga hasil, teknologi maklumat dan komunikasi, kesedaran awam dan rasuah. 
Kajian itu juga mendedahkan bahawa terdapat hubungan yang signifikan antara kecekapan 
pentadbiran cukai dan amalan audit yang kukuh dan motivasi serta insentif. Penemuan 
kualitatif kajian juga menunjukkan bahawa reformasi dan penstrukturan semula sistem cukai 
dan pemberian autonomi boleh membantu meningkatkan penjanaan pendapatan dan 
kecekapan pentadbiran. Penemuan kajian kualitatif menunjukkan bahawa autonomi, 
kesedaran awam dan penggunaan teknologi maklumat dan komunikasi adalah sebahagian 
daripada penentu kecekapan pentadbiran cukai. Oleh itu , kajian ini mencadangkan bahawa 
kerajaan perlu meletakkan langkah yang berkesan untuk memungut cukai daripada pelbagai 
kumpulan dengan taraf ekonomi yang berbeza. 
 
Kata kunci: kecekapan pentadbiran cukai, autonomi. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION OF THE STUDY 
 
1.1 Introduction 
This chapter provides an overview of the study and a summary of some of the key research 
outcomes. The chapter begins with the background of the study, problem statement, research 
objectives and research questions, significance and scope of the study. The chapter also 
provides the foundation for the next chapter. 
 
1.2 Background of the Study 
The primary obligation of a government is to ensure well-being of the citizens through 
development of the country. To achieve this, many governments across the globe face 
challenges, one of which is revenue generation. According to Thomas (2012), estimated 
global tax evasion is over USD3 trillion annually. Her Majesty‟s Revenue and Customs  
(2012) report on tax evasion shows that defaulters in the United Kingdom (UK), including 
those operating in the „underground‟ economy and those who undertake criminal attacks on 
the tax system, denied the public purse an estimated £14 billion in 2010 - 2011. Edgar and 
Feige (2009) found that over USD2 trillion has been estimated to be lost from unreported 
income in the last decade in the United States (US), mostly by small businesses and 
employees, resulting in a tax gap ranging from USD430 to USD475 billion per year. He 
further stated that 18 - 19% of total reportable income is not properly reported to the Internal 
Revenue Service, and has been an issue of serious concern to the US authorities.  
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APPENDIX 1: QUESTIONNAIRE 
 
 
A SURVEY ON THE DETERMINANT OF TAX ADMINISTRATION EFFICIENCY: 
A STUDY OF BAUCHI STATE INTERNAL REVENUE 
Dear respondents,  
I am a Masters (International Accounting) student of School of Accountancy, Universiti Utara 
Malaysia. I am currently conducting a research on the topic: Determinant of Tax 
Administration Efficiency: A study of Bauchi State Internal Revenue. I hereby solicit for your 
opinion through the medium of questionnaire. 
This questionnaire is purely for academic research purpose. Any information provided will be 
strictly treated confidentially and will be used for the purpose which it was meant for. As such 
your identity is not required.  
Thank you so much in anticipating your cooperation and assistance. 
Yours Sincerely, 
 Shamsudeen Ladan Shagari 
+60149078349 
shagareez@gmail.com 
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Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree to each of the statement below, use 
the scale below to indicate your answer. 
1- Strongly disagree (SD) 2- Disagree (D) 3- Not sure (NS) 4- Agree (A) 5- Strongly Agree 
(SA) 
  SD D NS A SA 
1. In my view our tax system has an efficient collection 
process 
1 2 3 4 5 
2. Income generated from tax revenue by my organization 
has been impressive due to efficient tax administration 
1 2 3 4 5 
3. My organization has adequate infrastructures for efficient 
tax administration 
1 2 3 4 5 
4. My organization has well-trained staff  for efficient tax 
administration 
1 2 3 4 5 
5. In my opinion our tax administrative structure lack 
autonomy 
1 2 3 4 5 
6. Politicians interferes too much with the activities of 
Board of Internal Revenue  
1 2 3 4 5 
7. The  Board of Internal Revenue has autonomy in 
recruitment and dismissal of staff 
1 2 3 4 5 
8. The Board of Internal Revenue has autonomy in budget 
preparation and implementation 
1 2 3 4 5 
9. The Board of Internal Revenue takes most of the 
decisions itself after consulting the Ministry of Finance 
1 2 3 4 5 
10. The Board of Internal Revenue has the autonomy to 
recruit and dismiss staff 
1 2 3 4 5 
11. The Board provides me with useful  ICT trainings in the 
daily working procedures  
1 2 3 4 5 
12. The Board provides online facility in my desk 1 2 3 4 5 
13. The Board regularly maintained  our ICT infrastructures 
(digital devices, internet facility)  
1 2 3 4 5 
14. The Board ensure that our organizational website is well 
maintained and updated 
1 2 3 4 5 
15. The board employs strong tax audit to achieved Targeted 
Revenue 
1 2 3 4 5 
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16. The Board employs strong tax audit to solve the problems 
of tax evasion, avoidance and other irregularities 
1 2 3 4 5 
17. The Board employs strong tax audit to ensure the 
submission of accurate and current returns 
1 2 3 4 5 
18. The Board creates awareness of strong tax audit to makes 
the taxpayers render a satisfactory returns 
1 2 3 4 5 
19. Public enlightenment campaign on utilisation of tax 
revenue by Board of Internal Revenue  will encourage tax 
payment 
1 2 3 4 5 
20. Issuance of tax payment notice  in reasonable time by 
Board of Internal Revenue will encourage tax payment 
1 2 3 4 5 
21. Public enlightenment by Board of Internal Revenue will  
make people in the informal sector pay their tax regularly 
1 2 3 4 5 
22. Public enlightenment campaign by Board of Internal 
Revenue on sanctions and penalty for noncompliance will 
encourage tax payments 
1 2 3 4 5 
23. I have been motivated by my organization to put my best 
effort in my job done 
1 2 3 4 5 
24. I have been remunerated for staying beyond the working 
hours to finish my daily routine task 
1 2 3 4 5 
25. Employees in my organization work as hard as employees 
in other organization with similar remuneration 
1 2 3 4 5 
26. I have been motivated by my organization to do extra 
work for my job that isn‟t normally expected for me 
1 2 3 4 5 
27. Time seems to drag while I am on the job 1 2 3 4 5 
28. Board of Internal Revenue explicitly disallow tax 
deductions for bribes to public officials 
1 2 3 4 5 
29. Board of Internal Revenue raises awareness among 
taxpayers that bribes are not deductible 
1 2 3 4 5 
30. Board of Internal Revenue Staff are authorised to report 
suspicious of corruption by taxpayers to the appropriate 
law enforcement authority 
1 2 3 4 5 
31. Board of Internal Revenue uses tax information sharing 
agreements with other States Board of Internal Revenue 
to obtain and provide information to determine whether a 
1 2 3 4 5 
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deducted payment constitutes a bribe. 
 
DEMOGRAHIC BACKGROUND 
Instruction: please tick () in the correct response where appropriate. 
1. Age [group]      
[ ] 20 – 30           
[ ] 31 – 40          
[ ] 41 – 50          
[ ] 51 – 60          
[ ] Above 60 years  
2. Gender       
[ ] Male          
[ ] Female          
3.  Educational background           
[ ] Secondary School Certificate 
[ ] Diploma Certificate           
[ ] Degree B.sc/Higher National Diploma (HND)  
[ ] Master degree/Ph. D 
4. Position 
[ ] Top Management 
[ ] Middle Management 
[ ] Supporting Management            
5. Marital Status 
[ ] Married 
[ ] Single 
[ ] Divorce 
6. Religion 
[ ] Islam  
[ ] Christian  
[ ] Others 
 
 
 
THANK YOU FOR YOUR COOPERATION 
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APPEDIX 2: Measurement of Variable 
 
Table 3.2: Measurement of Variable Tax Administration Efficiency 
Name of 
Variable 
Measurement Item Sources 
Tax 
Administration 
Efficiency 
Tax administration system in Nigeria is complex Abiola and 
Asiweh (2012) 
 Income tax structure is equitable Abiola and 
Asiweh (2012) 
 Tax system has an inefficient tax collection process Abiola and 
Asiweh (2012) 
 Nigeria tax System is progressive in nature Abiola and 
Asiweh (2012) 
 
 
 
Table 3.3: Measurement of Variable Autonomy of Tax Authority 
Name of 
Variable 
Measurement Item Sources 
Autonomy of 
Tax authority 
Tax Administrative  structure in Nigeria lack Autonomy Abiola and 
Asiweh 
(2012) 
 Politicians interferes much with the Nigerian tax system Abiola and 
Asiweh 
(2012) 
 Tax authority has autonomy in recruitment and dismissal of 
staff 
EU (2007) 
 Tax authority has autonomy in budget preparation and 
implementation 
EU (2007) 
 Tax authority takes most of the decisions itself after 
consulting the ministry of finance  
Verscheure 
(2007) 
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Table 3.4: Measurement of Variable Use of ICT 
Name of 
Variable 
Measurement Item Sources 
Use of ICT Usefulness of  ICT trainings in the daily working 
procedures of my organization 
Upadhyaya 
(2011) 
 Having online facility in my desk Upadhyaya 
(2011) 
 ICT infrastructures (digital devices, internet facility) are 
regularly maintained in my organization 
Upadhyaya 
(2011) 
 To what extent, do you agree that the website of your 
organization is well maintained and updated 
Upadhyaya 
(2011) 
   
 
 
Table 3.5: Measurement of Variable Strong Audit Practice 
Name of 
Variable 
Measurement Item Sources 
Strong Audit 
Practice 
Tax audit is employed by Relevant Tax Authority (RTA) to 
achieved Target Revenue 
Badara 
(2012) 
 Tax audit solves the problems of tax evasion, avoidance 
and other irregularities 
Badara 
(2012) 
 Tax audit ensures the submission of accurate and current 
returns 
Badara 
(2012) 
 The awareness of tax audit makes the tax payers to render a 
satisfactory returns 
Badara 
(2012) 
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Table 3.6: Measurement of Variable Public Enlightenment 
Name of 
Variable 
Measurement Item Sources 
Public 
Enlightenment 
Public enlightenment on utilisation of tax revenue  will 
encourage tax payment 
Abiola and 
Asiweh 
(2012) 
 Tax authority issues tax payment notice in reasonable time Abiola and 
Asiweh 
(2012) 
 Public enlightenment make people in the informal sector pay 
their tax regularly 
Abiola and 
Asiweh 
(2012) 
 Tax authority makes people aware about sanctions and 
penalty for noncompliance 
Badara 
(2012) 
 
Table 3.7: Measurement of variable Motivation and Incentives 
Name of 
Variable 
Measurement Item Sources 
Staff 
remuneration 
and motivation 
 
I have been motivated by my organization to put my best 
effort my job done 
 
Wright 
(2004) 
 I have been remunerated for staying beyond the working 
hours to finish in my daily routine task 
 
Wright 
(2004) 
  
Employees in my organization work as hard as employees in 
other organization with similar remuneration 
Wright 
(2004)  
  
I have been motivated by my organization to do extra work 
for my job that isn‟t normally expected for me 
Wright 
(2004) 
 Time seems to drag while I am on the job Wright 
(2004) 
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Table 3.8: Measurement of Variable Perceive Corruption  
Name of 
Variable 
Measurement Item Sources 
Perceive 
Corruption  
Tax systems explicitly disallow tax deductions for bribes to 
public officials 
OECD 
(2012) 
 Tax administrations raise awareness among taxpayers that 
bribes are not deductible 
OECD 
(2012) 
 Are tax authorities authorised to report suspicions of 
corruption to the  appropriate law enforcement authorities 
OECD 
(2012) 
 Tax authorities use tax information sharing agreements with 
other States to obtain and provide information to determine 
whether a deducted payment constitutes a bribe 
OECD 
(2012) 
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APPENDIX 3: DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS 
Summary of Descriptive Statistics of Variables 
Code Items Min Max Mean SD SA NS SD 
TAE1 Tax system has an efficient 
collection process 
1 5 4.21 0.92 105 
(90%) 
4 
(3%) 
8 
(7%) 
TAE2 Tax revenue by my 
organization has been 
impressive due to efficient 
tax administration 
1 5 3.93 0.72 91 
(78%) 
23 
(20%) 
3 
(2%) 
TAE3 Organization has adequate 
infrastructures for efficient 
tax administration 
1 5 3.81 0.84 89 
(76%) 
15 
(13%) 
13 
(11%) 
TAE4 Organization has well-
trained staff  for efficient tax 
administration 
1 5 4.14 0.81 99 
(85%) 
14 
(12%) 
4 
(3%) 
ABIR1 our tax administrative 
structure lack autonomy 
1 5 2.99 1.18 47 
(40%) 
21 
(18%) 
49 
(42%) 
ABIR3 Board of Internal Revenue 
has autonomy in recruitment 
and dismissal of staff 
2 5 4.01 0.86 85 
(73%) 
4 
(3%) 
28 
(24%) 
ABIR4 Board of Internal Revenue 
has autonomy in budget 
preparation and 
implementation 
2 5 3.74 0.76 71 
(61%) 
4 
(3%) 
42 
(36%) 
ABIR6 Board of Internal Revenue 
has the autonomy to recruit 
and dismiss staff 
1 5 3.89 1.02 78 
(67%) 
23 
(21%) 
14 
(12%) 
ICT 1 The Board provides me with 
useful  ICT trainings in the 
daily working procedures 
2 5 3.96 0.68 88 
(75%) 
2 
(2%) 
27 
(23%) 
ICT 2 The Board provides online 
facility in my desk 
1 5 3.90 0.84 82 
(70%) 
23 
(20%) 
7 
(6%) 
ICT 3 The Board regularly 
maintained  our ICT 
infrastructures (digital 
2 5 4.12 0.69 37 
(32%) 
60 
(52%) 
20 
(17%) 
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devices, internet facility) 
ICT 4 The Board ensure that our 
organizational website is 
well maintained and updated 
1 5 4.10 0.66 104 
(89%) 
11 
(10%) 
2 
(1%) 
SAP1 The board employs strong 
tax audit to achieved 
Targeted Revenue 
1 5 4.30 0.77 106 
(91%) 
8 
(7%) 
3 
(3%) 
SAP2 The Board employs strong 
tax audit to solve the 
problems of tax evasion, 
avoidance and other 
irregularities 
2 5 4.24 0.59 41 
(35%) 
70 
(60%) 
6 
(5%) 
SAP3 The Board employs strong 
tax audit to ensure the 
submission of accurate and 
current returns 
2 5 4.17 0.55 109 
(93%) 
7 
(6%) 
1 
(1%) 
SAP4 The Board creates awareness 
of strong tax audit to makes 
the taxpayers render a 
satisfactory returns 
2 5 4.19 0.65 107 
(91%) 
7 
(6%) 
3 
(3) 
PE 1 Public enlightenment by 
Board of Internal Revenue 
will  make people in the 
informal sector pay their tax 
regularly 
2 5 4.42 0.64 111 
(95%) 
4 
(3%) 
2 
(2%) 
PE 2 Issuance of tax payment 
notice  in reasonable time by 
Board of Internal Revenue 
will encourage tax payment 
1 5 4.10 0.78 105 
(90%) 
7 
(6%) 
5 
(4%) 
PE 3 Public enlightenment by 
Board of Internal Revenue 
will  make people in the 
informal sector pay their tax 
regularly 
3 5 4.00 0.60 92 
(79%) 
 
25 
(21%) 
0 
PE 4 Public enlightenment 
campaign by Board of 
Internal Revenue on 
sanctions and penalty for 
noncompliance will 
encourage tax payments 
2 5 3.87 0.66 87 
(74%) 
28 
(24%) 
2 
(2%) 
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MAI1 I have been motivated by my 
organization to put my best 
effort in my job done 
1 5 3.77 1.08 80 
(68%) 
15 
(13%) 
22 
(19%) 
MAI2 I have been remunerated for 
staying beyond the working 
hours to finish my daily 
routine task 
1 5 3.51 0.95 73 
(62%) 
20 
(17%) 
24 
(21%) 
PC 1 Board of Internal Revenue 
explicitly disallow tax 
deductions for bribes to 
public officials 
1 5 3.89 0.78 85 
(73%) 
28 
(24%) 
4 
(3%) 
PC 2 Board of Internal Revenue 
raises awareness among 
taxpayers that bribes are not 
deductible 
2 5 3.84 0.78 87 
(74%) 
21 
(18%) 
9 
(8%) 
PC 3 Board of Internal Revenue 
Staff are authorised to report 
suspicious of corruption by 
taxpayers to the appropriate 
law enforcement authority 
3 5 4.09 0.46 109 
(93%) 
8 
(7%) 
0 
PC 4 Board of Internal Revenue 
uses tax information sharing 
agreements with other States 
Board of Internal Revenue to 
obtain and provide 
information to determine 
whether a deducted payment 
constitutes a bribe. 
3 5 3.92 0.52 86 
(74%) 
31 
(26%) 
0 
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APPENDIX 4: RELIABILITY ANALYSIS 
Tax Administration Efficiency 
 
Reliability Statistics 
Cronbach's 
Alpha 
Cronbach's 
Alpha Based 
on 
Standardized 
Items 
N of 
Items 
.597 .599 4 
 
 
Item-Total Statistics 
 
Scale Mean 
if Item 
Deleted 
Scale 
Variance if 
Item Deleted 
Corrected 
Item-Total 
Correlation 
Squared 
Multiple 
Correlation 
Cronbach's 
Alpha if 
Item 
Deleted 
TAX ADMIN 
EFFICIENCY 1 
11.88 3.017 .356 .135 .547 
TAX ADMIN 
EFFICIENCY 2 
12.17 3.542 .348 .124 .549 
TAX ADMIN 
EFFICIENCY 3 
12.28 3.121 .397 .180 .510 
TAX ADMIN 
EFFICIENCY 4 
11.96 3.144 .417 .190 .495 
 
Autonomy of Board of Internal Revenue 
 
Reliability Statistics 
Cronbach's 
Alpha 
Cronbach's 
Alpha Based 
on 
Standardized 
Items 
N of 
Items 
.715 .718 4 
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Item-Total Statistics 
 
Scale Mean 
if Item 
Deleted 
Scale 
Variance if 
Item Deleted 
Corrected 
Item-Total 
Correlation 
Squared 
Multiple 
Correlation 
Cronbach's 
Alpha if 
Item 
Deleted 
AUTONOMY OF 
BOARD OF 
INTERNAL 
REVENUE 1 
11.64 3.884 .611 .384 .584 
AUTONOMY OF 
BOARD OF 
INTERNAL 
REVENUE 3 
10.61 5.372 .507 .269 .653 
AUTONOMY OF 
BOARD OF 
INTERNAL 
REVENUE 4 
10.89 5.919 .440 .247 .691 
AUTONOMY OF 
BOARD OF 
INTERNAL 
REVENUE 6 
10.74 4.872 .491 .292 .661 
 
 
Information and Communication Technology 
 
Reliability Statistics 
Cronbach's 
Alpha 
Cronbach's 
Alpha Based 
on 
Standardized 
Items 
N of 
Items 
.745 .753 4 
 
88 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Item-Total Statistics 
 
Scale Mean 
if Item 
Deleted 
Scale 
Variance if 
Item Deleted 
Corrected 
Item-Total 
Correlation 
Squared 
Multiple 
Correlation 
Cronbach's 
Alpha if 
Item 
Deleted 
INFORMATION AND 
COMMUNICATION 
TECHNOLOGY 1 
12.12 3.122 .482 .417 .717 
INFORMATION AND 
COMMUNICATION 
TECHNOLOGY 2 
12.19 2.688 .491 .443 .726 
INFORMATION AND 
COMMUNICATION 
TECHNOLOGY 3 
11.97 2.896 .576 .478 .667 
INFORMATION AND 
COMMUNICATION 
TECHNOLOGY 4 
11.98 2.881 .636 .507 .638 
 
Strong Audit Practice 
 
Reliability Statistics 
Cronbach's 
Alpha 
Cronbach's 
Alpha Based 
on 
Standardized 
Items 
N of 
Items 
.734 .751 4 
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Item-Total Statistics 
 
Scale Mean 
if Item 
Deleted 
Scale 
Variance if 
Item Deleted 
Corrected 
Item-Total 
Correlation 
Squared 
Multiple 
Correlation 
Cronbach's 
Alpha if 
Item 
Deleted 
STRONG AUDIT 
PRACTICE 1 
12.60 2.185 .423 .209 .755 
STRONG AUDIT 
PRACTICE 2 
12.66 2.346 .593 .353 .640 
STRONG AUDIT 
PRACTICE 3 
12.73 2.422 .601 .409 .642 
STRONG AUDIT 
PRACTICE 4 
12.71 2.276 .538 .381 .667 
 
 
Public Enlightenment 
 
Reliability Statistics 
Cronbach's 
Alpha 
Cronbach's 
Alpha Based 
on 
Standardized 
Items 
N of 
Items 
.632 .629 4 
 
 
 
 
 
Item-Total Statistics 
 
Scale Mean 
if Item 
Deleted 
Scale 
Variance if 
Item Deleted 
Corrected 
Item-Total 
Correlation 
Squared 
Multiple 
Correlation 
Cronbach's 
Alpha if 
Item 
Deleted 
PUBLIC 
ENLIGHTENMENT 1 
11.96 2.379 .351 .225 .603 
PUBLIC 
ENLIGHTENMENT 2 
12.29 1.813 .497 .308 .494 
PUBLIC 
ENLIGHTENMENT 3 
12.38 2.441 .364 .231 .594 
PUBLIC 
ENLIGHTENMENT 4 
12.51 2.180 .443 .293 .539 
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Motivation and Incentives 
 
Reliability Statistics 
Cronbach's 
Alpha 
Cronbach's 
Alpha Based 
on 
Standardized 
Items 
N of 
Items 
.541 .544 2 
 
Item-Total Statistics 
 
Scale Mean 
if Item 
Deleted 
Scale 
Variance if 
Item Deleted 
Corrected 
Item-Total 
Correlation 
Squared 
Multiple 
Correlation 
Cronbach's 
Alpha if 
Item 
Deleted 
MOTIVATION AND 
INCENTIVES 1 
3.51 .920 .373 .139 .
a
 
MOTIVATION AND 
INCENTIVES 2 
3.77 1.173 .373 .139 .
a
 
a. The value is negative due to a negative average covariance among items. This violates 
reliability model assumptions. You may want to check item codings. 
 
 
 
Perceive Corruption 
 
Reliability Statistics 
Cronbach's 
Alpha 
Cronbach's 
Alpha Based 
on 
Standardized 
Items 
N of 
Items 
.658 .654 4 
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Item-Total Statistics 
 
Scale Mean 
if Item 
Deleted 
Scale 
Variance if 
Item Deleted 
Corrected 
Item-Total 
Correlation 
Squared 
Multiple 
Correlation 
Cronbach's 
Alpha if 
Item 
Deleted 
PERCEIVE 
CORRUPTION 1 
11.84 1.691 .536 .380 .518 
PERCEIVE 
CORRUPTION 2 
11.90 1.574 .611 .400 .448 
PERCEIVE 
CORRUPTION 3 
11.65 2.355 .580 .358 .540 
PERCEIVE 
CORRUPTION 4 
11.81 2.906 .126 .035 .750 
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APPENDIX 5: FACTOR LOADING ANALYSIS 
 
KMO and Bartlett's Test 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling 
Adequacy. 
.634 
Bartlett's Test of 
Sphericity 
Approx. Chi-Square 1529.159 
Df 325 
Sig. .000 
 
 
Total Variance Explained 
Compone
nt Initial Eigenvalues 
Extraction Sums of Squared 
Loadings Rotation Sums of Squared Loadings 
Total 
% of 
Varianc
e 
Cumulative 
% Total 
% of 
Varianc
e 
Cumulative 
% Total 
% of 
Variance Cumulative % 
d
i
m
e
n
s
i
o
n
0 
1 5.048 19.414 19.414 5.048 19.414 19.414 3.106 11.945 11.945 
2 3.220 12.384 31.798 3.220 12.384 31.798 2.693 10.357 22.302 
3 2.661 10.235 42.032 2.661 10.235 42.032 2.685 10.327 32.629 
4 2.037 7.836 49.868 2.037 7.836 49.868 2.496 9.601 42.230 
5 1.781 6.851 56.720 1.781 6.851 56.720 2.334 8.976 51.206 
6 1.464 5.631 62.350 1.464 5.631 62.350 2.138 8.222 59.428 
7 1.283 4.933 67.283 1.283 4.933 67.283 1.638 6.302 65.730 
8 1.231 4.734 72.017 1.231 4.734 72.017 1.635 6.288 72.017 
9 .922 3.546 75.563       
10 .892 3.430 78.993       
11 .804 3.091 82.083       
12 .688 2.647 84.730       
13 .563 2.167 86.897       
14 .529 2.036 88.933       
15 .447 1.718 90.651       
16 .374 1.437 92.088       
17 .323 1.244 93.331       
18 .313 1.205 94.536       
19 .268 1.032 95.568       
20 .226 .867 96.436       
21 .219 .842 97.277       
22 .183 .705 97.983       
23 .152 .585 98.568       
24 .138 .529 99.097       
25 .122 .471 99.568       
26 .112 .432 100.000       
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Total Variance Explained 
Compone
nt Initial Eigenvalues 
Extraction Sums of Squared 
Loadings Rotation Sums of Squared Loadings 
Total 
% of 
Varianc
e 
Cumulative 
% Total 
% of 
Varianc
e 
Cumulative 
% Total 
% of 
Variance Cumulative % 
d
i
m
e
n
s
i
o
n
0 
1 5.048 19.414 19.414 5.048 19.414 19.414 3.106 11.945 11.945 
2 3.220 12.384 31.798 3.220 12.384 31.798 2.693 10.357 22.302 
3 2.661 10.235 42.032 2.661 10.235 42.032 2.685 10.327 32.629 
4 2.037 7.836 49.868 2.037 7.836 49.868 2.496 9.601 42.230 
5 1.781 6.851 56.720 1.781 6.851 56.720 2.334 8.976 51.206 
6 1.464 5.631 62.350 1.464 5.631 62.350 2.138 8.222 59.428 
7 1.283 4.933 67.283 1.283 4.933 67.283 1.638 6.302 65.730 
8 1.231 4.734 72.017 1.231 4.734 72.017 1.635 6.288 72.017 
9 .922 3.546 75.563       
10 .892 3.430 78.993       
11 .804 3.091 82.083       
12 .688 2.647 84.730       
13 .563 2.167 86.897       
14 .529 2.036 88.933       
15 .447 1.718 90.651       
16 .374 1.437 92.088       
17 .323 1.244 93.331       
18 .313 1.205 94.536       
19 .268 1.032 95.568       
20 .226 .867 96.436       
21 .219 .842 97.277       
22 .183 .705 97.983       
23 .152 .585 98.568       
24 .138 .529 99.097       
25 .122 .471 99.568       
26 .112 .432 100.000       
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
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Rotated Component Matrix
a
 
 
Component 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
STRONG AUDIT 
PRACTICE 3 
.829               
STRONG AUDIT 
PRACTICE 4 
.772               
PUBLIC 
ENLIGHTENMENT 1 
.677               
STRONG AUDIT 
PRACTICE 2 
.640               
INFORMATION AND 
COMMUNICATION 
TECHNOLOGY 1 
.533 .434             
INFORMATION AND 
COMMUNICATION 
TECHNOLOGY 3 
.532 .478             
INFORMATION AND 
COMMUNICATION 
TECHNOLOGY 4 
  .803             
INFORMATION AND 
COMMUNICATION 
TECHNOLOGY 2 
  .792             
TAX ADMIN 
EFFICIENCY 4 
  .688             
AUTONOMY OF 
BOARD OF 
INTERNAL 
REVENUE 1 
    .866           
AUTONOMY OF 
BOARD OF 
INTERNAL 
REVENUE 3 
    .677           
AUTONOMY OF 
BOARD OF 
INTERNAL 
REVENUE 4 
    .641           
AUTONOMY OF 
BOARD OF 
INTERNAL 
REVENUE 6 
    .591           
PUBLIC 
ENLIGHTENMENT 2 
      .750         
STRONG AUDIT 
PRACTICE 1 
      .717         
TAX ADMIN 
EFFICIENCY 1 
      .606       .461 
PERCEIVE 
CORRUPTION 3 
        .800       
PERCEIVE 
CORRUPTION 2 
        .760       
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PERCEIVE 
CORRUPTION 1 
        .713       
PUBLIC 
ENLIGHTENMENT 3 
          .886     
PUBLIC 
ENLIGHTENMENT 4 
          .721     
MOTIVATION AND 
INCENTIVES 2 
            .858   
MOTIVATION AND 
INCENTIVES 1 
            .512   
PERCEIVE 
CORRUPTION 4 
              .715 
TAX ADMIN 
EFFICIENCY 3 
              .601 
TAX ADMIN 
EFFICIENCY 2 
    .439         .442 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.  
 Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization. 
a. Rotation converged in 19 iterations. 
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APPENDIX 6: CORRELATION ANALYSIS 
 
Correlations 
 TAE ABIR ICT SAP PE MAI PC 
TA
E 
Pearson 
Correlation 
1 .332
**
 .329
**
 .166 .278
**
 -.164 .228
*
 
Sig. (2-tailed)  .000 .000 .074 .002 .077 .013 
N 117 117 117 117 117 117 117 
ABI
R 
Pearson 
Correlation 
.332
**
 1 .249
**
 .131 -.007 -.247
**
 .175 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000  .007 .158 .940 .007 .059 
N 117 117 117 117 117 117 117 
ICT Pearson 
Correlation 
.329
**
 .249
**
 1 .346
**
 .098 -.173 .473
**
 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .007  .000 .294 .063 .000 
N 117 117 117 117 117 117 117 
SAP Pearson 
Correlation 
.166 .131 .346
**
 1 .233
*
 .068 .437
**
 
Sig. (2-tailed) .074 .158 .000  .012 .465 .000 
N 117 117 117 117 117 117 117 
PE Pearson 
Correlation 
.278
**
 -.007 .098 .233
*
 1 .156 .078 
Sig. (2-tailed) .002 .940 .294 .012  .094 .403 
N 117 117 117 117 117 117 117 
MA
I 
Pearson 
Correlation 
-.164 -.247
**
 -.173 .068 .156 1 -.001 
Sig. (2-tailed) .077 .007 .063 .465 .094  .989 
N 117 117 117 117 117 117 117 
PC Pearson 
Correlation 
.228
*
 .175 .473
**
 .437
**
 .078 -.001 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .013 .059 .000 .000 .403 .989  
N 117 117 117 117 117 117 117 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
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APPENDIX 7: REGRESSION ANALYSIS 
 
Model Summary
b
 
Model 
R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of 
the Estimate 
d
i
m
e
n
s
i
o
n
0 
1 .505
a
 .255 .214 .49667 
a. Predictors: (Constant), PC, MAI, PE, ABIR, SAP, ICT 
b. Dependent Variable: TAE 
 
 
ANOVA
b
 
Model Sum of 
Squares Df 
Mean 
Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 9.289 6 1.548 6.276 .000
a
 
Residual 27.135 110 .247   
Total 36.425 116    
a. Predictors: (Constant), PC, MAI, PE, ABIR, SAP, ICT 
b. Dependent Variable: TAE 
 
 
 
Coefficients
a
 
Model Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
T Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) 1.155 .637  1.812 .073 
ABIR .194 .069 .247 2.829 .006 
ICT .195 .101 .190 1.932 .025 
SAP -.031 .110 -.027 -.278 .390 
PE .334 .103 .278 3.248 .001 
MAI -.074 .058 -.111 -1.271 .103 
PC .103 .121 .085 .850 .198 
a. Dependent Variable: TAE 
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APPENDIX 8: HISTOGRAM 
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APPENDIX 9: NORMAL P-P PLOT 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
